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Problems for Western ~ntelligence in 
the New Century 
by Mkhael Herman 
Tbe following text is the presentation by Michael Hemzan on a seminar at the Norwegian 
Institute of Defence Studies 23 May 2005 
I retired from British government service in 
1987, and by then the Cold War had 
established intelligence everywhere as a 
permanent part of the peacetime state. Events 
after 1990 confirmed this position, but with 
greatly changed roles. I sketch here the 
changes of the 1990s, and then the issues 
raised by subsequent events. I talk mainly 
about the British system, in conjunction with 
the American one, but I touch also on 
""Western" intelligence, "democratic" 
intelligence, and intelligence everywhere. 
1990-2000: Intelligence after the Cold 
War 
The Cold War was particularly an 
intelligence war. When it was over, some 
Western effort against Russia continued, but 
intelligence as a whole took its share of the 
cuts of the "peace dividend". It was a time of 
appraisals of its future role. Some Americans 
argued (unsuccessfully) that the CIA should 
move to providing support in America's 
economic "wars" with Japan and Europe, 
and there was speculation that intelligence 
everywhere should become concerned with 
new issues such as world health and global 
warming. The British and American 
intelligence communities did indeed increase 
their new efforts on the drug trade and other 
international crime. 
But radical change was checked as the 
1990s became a decade of international 
intervention by Western armed forces in 
Yugoslavia and elsewhere. Support to 
military operations became a high priority, 
and intelligence had to re-learn the Second 
World War lessons of providing operational 
and tactical support in warlike situations, in 
a period in which new technology appeared 
to be revolutionizing what intelligence could 
provide. 
With this and other requirements 
intelligence at the end of rhe century seemed 
to have found its new metier. It was no longer 
a safeguard against the ultimate threat of 
nuclear war, but was increasingly valuable 
against the newer targets of insurgency, state 
collapse, rogue states, terroristn, nuclear 
proliferation and the other threats that 
seemed bound up with them. Its budgets were 
stabilized, even slightly increased. It seemed 
to facilitate the surgical use of military 
power, in multinational enterprises for good 
causes. It fitted the American superpower's 
sense of mission, while Britain enjoyed rhe 
role of St George, slaying foreign dragons 
through its high-quality military 
professionals supported by the world class 
intelligence available through the 
transatlantic alliance. Compared with the 
Cold War, intelligence seemed less vital but 
more useful. 
The same period also saw a new impetus 
for intelligence's democratic oversight and 
legal basis. The United States had led the way 
in this from the mid-seventies onwards, but 
the process was at its height in the 1990s in 
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Britain and Western Europe, the former 
Warsaw Pact countries, Latin America, South 
Africa and South Korea: much of the world. 
There was an increased domestic legitimacy, 
some of which extended internationally. 
Norms were internationally promulgated, 
and became a criterion for accession to the 
European Union. The Hague Tribunal called 
for intelligence inputs to its investigation of 
crimes in the former Yugoslavia. Britain 
explicitly included "strengthening the 
capacity of [local] intelligence services to 
assess genuine outside threats" in its policy 
for Third World development.1 
So in the year 2000 I was upbeat about 
intelligence's prospects, and was fairly 
confident about its ethical justification. I had 
been stimulated by a student's question to his 
Oxford chaplain: could he apply in good 
conscience for a job in a secret agency? I 
argued that intelligence had to be considered 
as an amalgam of two things: the collection 
of information by special means, and the 
analvsis of all information on some subjects 
to produce expert, objective assessment, 
distinct from policy recommendation. On the 
second of these, objective assessment seen1ed 
self-evidently valuable; rhus in the Cold War 
the USSR seemed to have had massive covert 
collection but no facility for assessing it 
properly, and remained woefully ignorant 
about some aspects of its Western 
adversaries. I argued that information itself 
never killed or maimed anyone, and that 
good intelligence made for better 
international behaviour. Sir Percy Cradock's 
verdict on the British Joint Intelligence 
Committee (the JIC) was that "Despite the 
best intentions, government is usually a 
hand-to-mouth affair. The Committee made 
it less so" .2 Philosophers are wary about any 
idea of objective truth, but I was happy to 
credit intelligence with a professional 
aspiration towards truthfulness. 
On the other hand the activity of covert 
collection produces some ethical downs ides. 
Some maintain that the secret collection of 
others' secrets is dishonourable in itself, at 
least in peacetime. I argued more practically 
that some of this collection- by no means all 
-exacerbated tensions between states. It was 
depressing that Cold War-style espionage 
and counterespionage seemed to have 
continued between the former adversaries, 
and I wondered why they did not move 
towards an intelligence equivalent of mutual 
arms reduction. The issue of "spying on 
friends" kept coming up, for example in the 
Continental criticism of the US-led Echelon 
system of electronic interception. But I also 
pointed to the shift to non-state targets, 
already including terrorism; and I argued for 
tacit rules of the intelligence game between 
"decent" states. 
From these aspects I drew up an ethical 
balance sheet. Governments behaved better 
with good information and assessment than 
with bad, but intrusive collection produced 
inter-state friction. I suggested a new 
paradigm of intelligence, to be no longer a 
zero-sum contest between states, but a 
cooperative activity by states against 
common threats, many of them from non-
state entities. 
It also seemed clear how intelligence 
should operate. Tbe UK, US and Old 
Commonwealth had what seemed an 
admirable ethic for seeking objective 
assessment and judgment, telling truth to 
power; and I claimed, with hesitation, that 
this was also a "Western" one. I argued for 
more intelligence in multinational and UN 
operations, for international discussion of its 
doctrine, and for more explicit inclusion of it 
among the democratic ideas that were 
spreading worldwide. In short intelligence 
seemed to be gaining legitimacy, nationally 
and internationally. 
Events of 2001-2003 
Then came the shocks of the new century: the 
terrorist strike against Washington and New 
Clare Short (Secretary of State for International Dc\'dopmcnr), DFID Policy Statement Pol'crty mu/ the Security Sector, 
p. 6, the basis of an address at the Centre for Defence Studies London, 9 .March 1999. 
2 Pcrcy Cradock, Know Your Enemy: How the joint lntelligmce Committee Saw the \Vorld (London: !vlurray, 1002), p. 
302. 
York (the 9111 outrages), and then the failure 
to find the Weapons of Mass Destruction 
(WMDs) in Iraq. A succession of American 
investigations has demonstrated intelligence's 
apparent failures in both episodes and called 
for its reform. British intelligence attracted 
no blame for 9111, but its performance over 
Iraq has now created widespread doubts 
about its reliability. The government has 
justified its new, tough security legislation by 
pointing to intelligence's assessment of a 
serious and continuing terrorist threat; critics 
have replied that if it was so wrong over Iraq 
it cannot be trusted on anything else. So 
intelligence in both countries is under a 
cloud. 
In fact the two apparent failures were very 
different. The CIA actually gave good 
strategic warning in early August 2001 that a 
terrorist attack was being planned but was 
unable to provide tacrical warning of 
method, place and time. The problem the 
attack raised has been well described as 
"connecting up the dots" in diverse sets of 
data, including those of the separate foreign 
intelligence and domestic security 
institutions. Counterterrorism is not new, but 
the scale and ambition of AI Qaeda have 
given it new dimensions, and raise a raft of 
political and practical problems. But these 
are identifiable and it is reasonably clear how 
intelligence has to move to solve them, 
difficult though this is. 
On Iraqi WMD, on the other hand, 
intelligence was assessing not for tactical 
warning but for top decision-making of the 
highest politico-strategic kind. The task was 
difficult but not novel. It was a throw-back to 
the Cold War: estimating what weapons a 
secretive adversary possesses, and drawing 
conclusions in this process from an apparent 
absence of evidence. I am forcibly reminded 
of the transatlantic debates in the late 1950 
and early 1960s about the Soviet missile 
threat; were there hundreds of deployed 
ICBMs, or none at all? 
We still do not know precisely what 
British and American intelligence said about 
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Iraq in all its classified reports and oral 
briefings. The British reports undoubtedly 
referred to the patchiness of the evidence. The 
Prime Minister certainly cherry-picked and 
exaggerated. Nevertheless I suggest that the 
UK and US intelligence communities both 
believed that the weapons of mass 
destruction existed in some form, and were 
content that this was the message their 
governments would take from them. There 
were no takers for the hypothesis that there 
were no operational weapons. Intelligence 
may have been uncertain, but it was not 
strident enough in its uncertainty, when for 
both governments the existence of these 
weapons had become an article of faith. 
So intelligence was wrong: 
understandably so, and by quite a fine 
margin, but wrong nevertheless.3 I will not 
speculate about the difference this made to 
the course of events. But for intelligence's 
own future in government the doubt posed is 
not whether it can work at joining up the dots 
in counterterrorism, bur whether it is ever 
capable of questioning deeply rooted 
conventional wisdom on strategic issues, in 
circumstances of high government 
importance and stress. It has to be on the 
same wavelength as government to have any 
credibility and be useful, but is that 
compatible with providing objective, policy-
free assessment? Is it, instead, just a placebo 
to reinforce government's conviction? 
The doubt goes to the root of ideas of 
intelligence's domestic and international 
legitimacy. Modern governments are 
expected to justify security policies by 
quoting intelligence, in the same way as they 
cite government statistics as evidence on 
other things; but intelligence is now suspect 
of cooking the books for them. Should one be 
less confident than five years ago in advising 
the Oxford student that joining intelligence 
can contribute to a better world? 
.) :VUifrid Braut~Hegghammcr and Olav Riste, ''\'\!ere WMDs tlw Real issue? The International Community versus Iraq 
199 1-2003 ", Forst•arsstudier, no. 4 (2005). 
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Reassessment 
So the Iraq failure points to reviewing my 
ethical balance sheet, and three related 
developments point in the same direction. 
First, the UK-US invasion highlighted 
intelligence's increased connection with the 
use of force. Some of it is now linked almost 
in real time with precise weaponry in the 
"sensor-to-shooter" linkage. The integration 
is now so close that it is harder to maintain 
that intelligence is only information and 
never harmed anyone itself. 
Second, the counterterrorist campaign has 
caused one intelligence method to acquire 
much greater ethical salience: the 
interrogation of prisoners and detainees. 
Everyone says that better human sources are 
needed on terrorism , but it is usually 
overlooked that interrogation is a major 
provider of this kind of information. 
Democracies are confused over the 
acceptable dividing lines between pressure 
and torture, and the publicity for 
interrogation has raised new doubts about 
intelligence as a whole. 
Third, there is what seems to be the 
growing role of covert action in 
counterterrorism, counterproliferation and 
negotiation over hostages: a role which 
makes intelligence services "doers" as well as 
information-collectors. A former member of 
the British Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) 
wrote a long time ago that "the essential skill 
of a secret service is to fet things done 
secretly and deniably", and recent American 
writing has indeed argued that intelligence 
operatives should be "hunters not 
h " 5 W . . 1 gat erers . estern practice JS per 1aps now 
rather closer than it used to be to the KGB 
doctrine that covert action was as important 
for intelligence organizations as information-
gathering. 
These three developments contribute to 
international scepticism about British and 
American intelligence, but the main factor in 
this is the failure over the WMD in Iraq. Here 
there is no mystery about the cause. 
Intelligence was not corrupt or self-serving. 
Its performance was a precise reproduction 
of the academic findings on cognitive rigidity 
and groupthink in closed groups. In Britain 
the groupthink effect was accentuated bv the 
closely-knit nature of the "Whitehall . 
village", and by developments in the JIC itself 
over twenty years in which governments of 
both parties have wanted black-and-white 
"action men", not given to seeing many 
shades of grey. Over Iraq these effects were 
compounded by a regrettable weakening of 
the scrutiny and validation of information 
from human agents, which ea used some kev 
reports to be wrongly assessed as reliable. ' 
Some of these factors applied also in 
Washington. Intelligence there is normally 
less close to the executive than in London , 
but the shock of 9/11 probably gave it a 
special urge to be 'on side' with government. 
An American writer claims that the terrorist 
threat had moved CIA to a policy of 
"w . t " 6 I 11· . . b I arntng-a -any-cost . nte tgence m ot 1 
capitals was too much influenced by 
government assumptions about the Iraqi 
threat. In such circumstances it always needs 
stronger nerves to be a dove than a l;awk. 
So what form should a post-mortem take? 
Part of it could, arguably, reconsider what we 
expect of intelligence. On Iraq it was 
providing assessments for policy at the 
highest government level. The UK and US 
practice of providing these in peacetime goes 
no further back than the beginning of the 
Cold War, and it is still largely an English-
speaking speciality. Most of the world's 192 
governments see intelligence in more limited 
ways, often as simply tbe secret collection of 
secrets: intelligence agencies submit their 
reports, and leaders themselves judge their 
significance. Or the opposite may apply, with 
intelligence fully involved in policy 
4 John .Brucc Lockhart, "Inrel~igcncc: a British View" in K.G. Robcnson (cd.), British and i\mericmr Approaches to 
Intelhgence (London: 1vb.cmlllan, 1987), p. ~6. 
5 
6 
Char,les Co~an, "'lnrdligcn~.e in the Twenry-First Century" in L.V. Scott and P.D. Jackson [cds.), Understanding 
Intelhg:nc.e 111. the Tw~1~ty-l-Irst ~entr~IJ': joumey~ into Sb,ulows (London: Rourlcdgc, 2004 ), p. 157. Cogan cit~s CIA's 
role of oftcnsrvc hunt tn tht: Afghamstan campaign against AI Qacda. 
Bob \X1oodward, fllau o{Attack (London: Simon and Schmtcr, 2004), p. 439. 
formation. In some regimes intelligence is 
itself part of the ruling elite. 
More commonly, the idea of intelligence's 
policy-free assessment has some acceptance, 
but only on selected subjects, not necessarily 
dealt with at the highest politico-strategic 
level. Military leaders everywhere look to 
their intelligence staffs for objective and 
expert assessment of the enemy, and the same 
applies to the authorities responsible for 
catching terrorists and thwarting their 
operations. Political assessment on the other 
hand often remains the business of foreign 
ministries. Bringing together the varied 
strands of departmental intelligence is often 
part of policy-making, and falls to Ministers 
and their staffs, not to intelligence on the 
British JIC model. 
Governments are served by intelligence in 
many different ways, and many of them 
probably regard the Anglophone idea of 
objective inputs to top-level policy formation 
as an unrealistic ideal. It is a useful reminder 
to us that it is only one of many things we 
expect from the system, and it is not 
necessarily the most important. For tactical 
support for counterterrorism, for example, 
the new British Joint Tactical Analysis Centre 
(JTAC) is probably more important than the 
JIC. Nevertheless I would certainly not 
recommend abandoning top-level 
assessment. How otherwise can we avoid 
government by intuition and "spinning" the 
evidence? 
Lessons from Iraq 
So what lessons are to be learned from Iraq? 
American commentators are arguing that 
radical re-thinking is needed, but at least for 
the British system I prefer a more pragmatic 
approach: keep the system but tune it to do 
better. One external influence is worth 
mentioning. Parliamentary oversight 
developed in Britain, as elsewhere, essentially 
to stop intelligence doing undesirable things. 
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Perhaps it should now do more to monitor 
intelligence's competence in getting things 
right. But the main requirement is to seek 
within government to improve quality in the 
assessment process and in its relationship 
with policy. 
The British investigating committee under 
Lord Butler has made sensible recommen-
dations to this end in its report? It looked 
critically at the central Assessments Staff on 
which JIC depends for its quality, and 
pointed out that it was not much bigger in 
2003 than when it was created in 1968. It 
also noted that the objective then was to 
create a high-quality, expett, semi-permanent 
staff, and that this had never actually 
happened. We have had instead a staff of 
talented people, almost all on temporary 
secondments from elsewhere, notablv our 
Foreign Office. This reflects in fact a wider 
feature of Britain's post-1945 intelligence 
arrangements. These provided quite well for 
covert collection at one end of the intelligence 
process, and for the JIC machinery for 
serving top government at the other, but did 
not give enough attention to the analysis that 
lies between them. Butler has bravely 
recommended creating an analysis special ism 
with a proper career structure, and a degree 
of integration into it of our Defence 
Intelligence Staff. 
He has been equally robust about the 
stature of the JIC Chairman. He 
recommended that the post-holder should no 
longer be junior to some members of his 
committee, and should be someone 
"demonstrably beyond influence, and thus 
probably in his last post". In effect this was 
revisiting a 194 7 recommendations that 
Ministers should have "a single individual to 
whom they could refer any general issue ... 
and would equally give to intelligence as a 
whole a spokesman well placed to voice its 
possibilities and its needs";8 in other words, 
government's chief intelligence officer. 
7 Review of lmelligcnce on Weapons of ~vtass Destruction: Report of a Committee of Privy Counsellors, Chairman The 
Rt Hon The Lord Butler of Brockwdl KG GCB CVO, HC 898 (London: The Srarioncry Office, 2004}. 
8 Reuil!wol/ntelligence Organi::<Jtions, 19-17 by Air Chief ivLushal Sir Douglas Evill, !vlisc/P 4781 6 November 1947: 
Nnlional Archives 163/7, p. 12. Quoted in the author's Intelligence Seruiccs in the lnfomwtion Age (London: Cass, 
2001), p. 115. 
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In its response the government has 
promised an increase in the Assessments 
Staff's size. It will also create a new post of 
professional Head of Intelligence Analysis, 
with a wide remit for improving analytic 
standards, including contacts outside 
government. It is still seeking a new long-
term Chairman of the .JIC itself, presumably 
searching for someone with the experience 
and seniority to make him demonstrably 
independent yet influential within Whitehall. 
Butler's was the first independent review 
of its kind since 194 7, and in these and its 
many other recommendations it provides a 
comprehensive tuning programme. My only 
disappointment is that on the intelligence-
policy nexus it could have done more to 
translate into practice an image of 
intelligence and policy operating in separate 
rooms, though with an open door between 
them. 
On this, in addition to his 
recommendation over the chairmanship, 
Butler considered the committee itself. It is, 
strictly speaking, not an intelligence body at 
all; it brings together all relevant government 
knowledge and judgment, not just 
intelligence's. Policy departments, 
particularly the Foreign Office, and senior 
policy advisers sit alongside the intelligence 
agencies. The result has many strengths, but 
is still the Whitehall consensus incarnate. 
Butler was aware of the American example of 
appointing distinguished academics to their 
Narional Intelligence Council, but rather 
surprisingly did not follow it. In this and 
other ways Britain still sees intelligence 
assessment as the preserve of long-serving 
"insiders", and does not yet recognize that 
some participation by "outsiders" might add 
something to the process. 
Conclusions 
I draw no sensational conclusions from this 
survey. Intelligence is flourishing worldwide, 
bur its roles and characteristics vary as much 
as the government systems in which it is set. 
We in Britain need some humility about 
recommending the principles of our own 
system as a world standard. Yet intelligence 
as it develops worldwide will be a menace if 
it does not constantly consider how the 
elusive qualities of independence and good 
judgement are to be cultivated, at the same 
time as empathy with power. 
At least in the British case, I suggest that 
the key is constant tuning of the system: 
looking at the small things and trying to 
make them better. Travelling hoJ'efully may 
be better than seeking to arrive. We have 
quite a good system, but have been roo 
satisfied with it for too long. As the poet 
Kipling wrote about the British defeats by the 
Boers in South Africa over a hundred years 
ago, 
Let us admit it fairly, as a business 
people should, 
We have had no end of a lesson: it 
will do us no end of good 
Perhaps there is also a lesson for governments 
and publics elsewhere. 
9 "To travel hopefully is a better thing than ro arrive, :md the true success is to labour" (IU .. Srcvenson, El Dorado). 
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